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COMMENTS
THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: REQUIRING PRIVATE
CARRIER ASSISTANCE TO REACH OUT AND
TAP SOMEONE IN THE INFORMATION AGE-
AN ANALYSIS OF THE DIGITAL TELEPHONY
ACT
"In countries where liberty is most esteemed, there are laws
by which a single person is deprived of it, in order to pre-
serve it for the whole community."1
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly two hundred-fifty years ago, the political philoso-
pher Montesquieu theorized that, in a free society, individu-
als must forfeit some liberties to further the liberty of society
as a whole. 2 Similar reasoning, and a desire to develop care-
ful guidelines governing the curtailment of individual liber-
ties, lay behind the establishment of federal wiretapping
3
statutes in the late 1960s.4 Yet, as technology evolves, the
need often arises for laws governing technology and society to
evolve as well.5
1. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 199 (Thomas Nugent
trans., Franz Neumann ed., Hafner Press 1949) (1748).
2. Id. Similar thinking is reflected in the writings of Rousseau: "[Elach
person alienates, by the social compact, only that portion of his power, his
goods, and liberty whose use is of consequence to the community." Jean-Jac-
ques Rousseau, The Social Contract, in THE BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS 157, 158
(Donald A. Cress ed. & trans., Oxford University Press 1987).
3. For the purposes of this comment, wiretapping is defined as
"[i]nterception... made by a connection with a telephone" without the attach-
ment of a separate device to the telephone itself. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41, 46 (1967).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 47-70.
5. This comment focuses on the effort to coordinate current law with cur-
rent technology in the wiretap area. For a more general discussion of the need
to coordinate current law with current technology, see ANNE W. BRANSCOMB,
WHO OWNS INFORMATION? (1994). According to Professor Branscomb, "[tihe law
will lumber along like an unwieldy dinosaur wending its way to extinction if it
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The Digital Telephony Act of 19946 ("DTA") exemplifies
such an evolution in federal wiretap law. Technological ad-
vances making it easier than ever for individuals to "reach
out and touch someone," often hinder law enforcement's abil-
ity to covertly do the same.7 The DTA aims to resolve the
dilemma posed by criminal activity conducted over telecom-
munication systems that law enforcement is unable to access
via traditional, legally cognizable wiretap techniques.8 In the
process, the DTA exemplifies the continuing struggle to
maintain the delicate balance between public and private lib-
erties9 in an era of rapidly advancing technology.
The DTA requires telephone companies to install equip-
ment enabling law enforcement to maintain the same ability
to conduct wiretaps that existed before recent telecommuni-
cation advances made traditional wiretapping techniques ob-
solete. 10 Nevertheless, the DTA's sponsors champion the Act
as a breakthrough for both law enforcement and privacy ad-
vocates. 1 Many civil liberties advocates 2 disagree, main-
cannot keep up with the pace of change in this new interactive, information-
intense environment." Id. at 5.
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2601-08 (1994). The statute is formally entitled: Telecom-
munication Carrier Assistance to the Government Act [hereinafter DTA]. H.R.
REP. No. 827, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., pt.1, at 1 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 HOUSE
REPORT]. The bill won congressional approval without debate on October 7,
1994 and was quickly signed into law by President Clinton. Benjamin Wittes, A
(Nearly) Lawless Frontier, RECORDER, Jan. 3, 1995, at 1.
7. See discussion infra part II.B.2.
8. 1994 HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 13. For purposes of this comment,
"telecommunication systems" is defined as common carrier equipment trans-
mitting oral conversations between parties. Examples include traditional tele-
phone services provided by carriers such as AT&T, MCI, Sprint, and local Bell
operators. Cellular and wireless communications available to the general pub-
lic also fall within this general definition. "Telecommunications carrier means
a person or entity engaged in the transmission or switching of wire or electronic
communications as a common carrier for hire." 18 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (1994).
9. "Liberty" is a somewhat nebulous and malleable term, briefly defined as
"[fIreedom from all restraints except such as are justly imposed by law."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 918 (6th ed. 1990). For the purposes of this comment,
in discussing wiretap law, the "private" side of liberty refers to the concepts of
privacy, freedom of expression, and property interests. The "public" side of lib-
erty refers to the rights and duties lawfully assigned to the government.
10. See infra part II.C.1.
11. See Memorandum from Don Edwards, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Civil and Constitutional Rights re Digital Telephony Legislation (Sept. 27,
1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Memorandum from Don Edwards]. In
addition to enhancing the government's ability to implement court authorized
wiretaps, the legislation contains several privacy provisions absent from the
wiretapping statutes it amends. See discussion infra part II.C.2. The new pro-
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taining the law sets a poor precedent for the burgeoning in-
formation age.13 These groups feel the DTA uses technology
to diminish, rather than further, personal privacy and forces
private telephone carrier involvement in what is traditionally
a governmental activity.' 4
The telephone industry15 and the technology privacy
group Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF"),16 although
eventually acquiescing in the Act, argue that the legislation
is both unnecessary and legally suspect.17 Within the tele-
phone industry in particular, there is concern that the DTA
will unduly burden technological development and may con-
stitute a government taking of private property without
compensation.' 8
visions, largely designed to protect the privacy of telecommunications not au-
thorized to be intercepted, makes the Act a double-edged sword to some privacy
advocates. See Mitch Betts, Privacy Protection Gives Wiretap Bill Double Edge,
COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 24, 1994, at 63. Nevertheless, opponents of the Act, such
as the American Civil Liberties Union, remain steadfast in their opposition.
See Congress Passes Wiretap Legislation; Senate Approves by Unanimous Con-
sent, Daily Report for Executives, Oct. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, CURNWS File.
12. Civil liberties groups active throughout the digital telephony debate in-
cluded the ACLU, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and the Electronic Pri-
vacy Information Center ("EPIC"). See Congress Passes Wiretap Legislation;
Senate Approves by Unanimous Consent, supra note 11.
13. For instance, the EPIC states that it has "lingering questions concern-
ing the need for such an unprecedented and far-reaching change in the law,"
adding that the DTA sets a bad precedent for the National Information Infra-
structure. Betts, supra note 11. See also Congress Passes Wiretap Legislation;
Senate Approves by Unanimous Consent, supra note 11 (noting that the ACLU
believes the DTA "creates a dangerous presumption that government has the
power to intercept private communications and to require private parties to cre-
ate special access.").
14. See Congress Passes Wiretap Legislation; Senate Approves by Unani-
mous Consent, supra note 11.
15. The industry speaks through its trade organization, the United States
Telephone Association [hereinafter USTA]. See Congress Passes Wiretap Leg-
islation; Senate Approves by Unanimous Consent, supra note 11.
16. The EFF, often referred to as the "ACLU of Cyberspace," is a group
dedicated to protecting civil liberties relating to emerging telecommunication
technologies. Marianne Lavell, Next Rights Battle is Going Online, NATIONAL
LAW JouRNAL, July 25, 1994, at Al. During hearings regarding the DTA, the
EFF acknowledged that the Act is "substantially less intrusive" than previous
proposals and included a number of significant privacy advances. See Congress
Passes Wiretap Legislation; Senate Approves by Unanimous Consent, supra note
11.
17. Id. See also infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
18. See discussion infra parts II.C.4.b, IV.D.
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This comment puts the DTA in its proper legal context by
reviewing the history and construction of the wiretap laws it
amends. 19 Following an examination of the current state of
telecommunication technology and resulting impediments to
wiretapping capabilities,2 ° the comment looks at the history
and construction of the Act itself.21 Next, the comment re-
views relevant judicial decisions that detractors claim under-
mine the DTA.2 2 The comment proceeds to identify the core
legal problems posed by the DTA, evaluating whether the Act
hampers, maintains, or improves the dynamic legal balance
between legitimate law enforcement interests and the tenets
of personal privacy. 23
Concluding that overall the DTA maintains and in many
ways improves the balance between public and private liberty
in light of technological change, 24 several solutions to the po-
tential legal infirmities of the Act are proposed.2 5 Finally, the
comment suggests that future efforts to draft legislation
aligning law and technology apply several key lessons dis-
cernible from the Digital Telephony debate.26
II. BACKGROUND
A. Wiretap Law Prior to the DTA: Legislative and Judicial
History of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968
Prior to 1968, electronic surveillance and the privacy of
telephonic communications 2v were largely unregulated
19. See infra part II.A.
20. See infra part II.B.2.
21. See infra part II.C.
22. See infra part II.C.4.
23. See infra parts III, IV.
24. See infra part IV.B.3.
25. See infra part V.
26. See infra part VI.
27. "Electronic surveillance" and "electronic eavesdropping" are broad
terms encompassing both wiretapping and recording through electronic devices
commonly known as "bugs." See Herman Schwartz, The Legitimation of Elec-
tronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order," 67 MICH. L. REv. 455,
457 n.12 (1969). See also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1967). Bugs
are separate devices in and of themselves capable of use in a variety of situa-
tions, while wiretaps merely intercept telephonic communications. Id. For the
purposes of this comment, the term "telephonic communications" includes all
oral conversations conducted through a common carrier such as a telephone
company. This would include conventional telephone services as well as more
recent cellular and wireless modes of communication. See supra note 8. While
[Vol. 37120
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fields.2" Both law enforcement and private individuals en-
gaged in wiretapping with little legal oversight.29 This per-
missive atmosphere was fostered in part by the United States
Supreme Court's 1928 decision in Olmstead v. United
States. ° Stating that conversations passing over telephone
lines did not fall within the Fourth Amendment's enumera-
tion of "houses, persons, papers, and effects,"3 ' the Olmstead
Court held that wiretapping did not violate the Fourth
Amendment unless it involved an unlawful entry into a phys-
32ical premises.
Although Congress made federally obtained wiretap evi-
dence inadmissible at trial by passing § 605 of the Federal
Communications Act 33 in 1934, this inadmissibility did not
prevent the use of wiretaps for other purposes.3 4 Addition-
ally, relying on the Supreme Court's Olmstead ruling, several
states passed laws permitting the use of state obtained wire-
tap evidence at trial. 8 An even greater number of states had
little or no law whatsoever governing wiretaps.36
this comment occasionally refers to electronic surveillance or electronic eaves-
dropping generally, the focus is on the wiretapping portion of the definition.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 30-39.
29. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967), at 127-28 re-
printed in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, app. 126-28 (1967) (White, J.,
dissenting) [hereinafter 1967 Commission Report]. See also Berger, 388 U.S. at
48-49 (stating that while federal law prohibits wiretaps, there is nevertheless
permissive use of wiretapping by law enforcement in some states, and that
other forms of electronic eavesdropping are even more prevalent).
30. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
31. 277 U.S. at 465. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
32. 277 U.S. at 465.
33. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958).
34. Although § 605 appeared to impose a complete ban on the interception
and disclosure of wire communications, "[tihe Department of Justice ... inter-
preted this section to permit interception so long as no disclosure of the content
outside the [d]epartment... [was] made." (e.g. wiretapping was permissible by
a federal agent but could not be used in court). 1967 Commission Report, supra
note 29, at 126-28.
35. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 112 (1967) (White, J., dissenting).
36. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
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Despite § 605's prohibition on the admission of wiretap
evidence gathered through federal assistance, a 1967 Presi-
dential Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice ("Commission") found no indication that state of-
ficers were ever prosecuted for using such evidence. v The
Commission further noted that "the Federal prohibition ...
(had) no effect on interception, and the lack of prosecutive
[sic] action ... substantially reduced respect for the law."38
Section 605's infirmities meant that private parties and law
enforcement were "invading the privacy of many citizens
without control from the courts and (without) reasonable leg-
islative standards."39
Concerned that § 605 inadequately protected personal
privacy, while simultaneously impeding legitimate law en-
forcement interests,4 ° the Commission stated:
The present status of the law with respect to wiretap-
ping and bugging is intolerable. It serves the interests
neither of privacy nor law enforcement ....
All members of the Commission agree on the diffi-
culty of striking the balance between law enforcement
benefits from the use of electronic surveillance and the
threat to privacy its use may entail.41
The Commission concluded that "legislation should be
enacted granting carefully circumscribed authority for elec-
tronic surveillance to law enforcement officers... [and that]
the availability of such specific authority would significantly
37. 1967 Commission Report, supra note 29 at 128.
38. Id.
39. Id. See also discussion supra note 34.
40. In the 1960s, law enforcement became increasingly concerned that re-
strictions on wiretaps were unduly hampering criminal prosecutions, particu-
larly with respect to organized crime. 1967 Commission Report, supra note 29
at 128. The Commission Report stated law enforcement's concern:
[Tihe evidence necessary to bring criminal sanctions to bear consist-
ently on the higher echelons of organized crime will not be obtained
without the aid of electronic surveillance techniques.
Members of the underworld, who have legitimate reason to fear
that their meetings might be bugged or their telephones tapped, have
continued to meet and make relatively free use of the telephone-for
communication is essential to the operation of any business enterprise.
Id. at 122-23.
41. Id. at 128.
122 [Vol. 37
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reduce the incentive for, and the incidence of, improper elec-
tronic surveillance."42
The Commission recommended that congressional action
on the surveillance issue be postponed, pending the U.S.
Supreme Court's resolution of an important surveillance
question on its 1967 docket.43  The case, Berger v. New
York, 44 presented the question of whether a New York stat-
ute permitting electronic eavesdropping violated the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments.45 Concerned with the expo-
nential proliferation of telephonic communications and moni-
toring thereof,46 the Supreme Court used Berger to limit its
Olmstead decision.47
In Berger, the Court expressly found that "conversation"
fell within the Fourth Amendment's protections. 48 Addition-
ally, the Court ruled that the use of electronic devices to cap-
ture such conversations constituted a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.49 With those portions of
Olmstead to the contrary now implicitly overruled,5" the
Court next examined whether the New York statute met the
Fourth Amendment's requirements. 51 Noting that the stat-
ute did not adequately require a showing of probable cause;
52
that it failed to require a description of the particular conver-
sation(s) sought;5 3 and that it possessed an insufficient war-
rant procedure,5 4 the Court held the New York statute
unconstitutional.55
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Berger was convicted on two counts of conspiracy to
bribe the Chairman of the New York State Liquor Authority. Id. at 44. Evi-
dence supporting the conviction was gathered through recording devices pursu-
ant to a court order. Id. at 44-45. The order was issued in accordance with a
New York statute permitting the use of such devices under specified conditions.
Id. Berger appealed the conviction, claiming, inter alia, that the State statute
was unconstitutional. Id. at 43-44. The trial court upheld the statute, as did
both the Appellate Division and the New York Court of Appeals. Id. at 44.
45. Id. at 41.
46. Id. at 46-49.
47. Id. at 50-52.
48. Id. at 51.
49. Berger, 388 U.S. at 51.
50. Id. at 50-64.
51. Id. at 54-64.
52. Id. at 55.
53. Id. at 56.
54. Berger, 388 U.S. at 60.
55. Id. at 64.
1231996]
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The following term, before Congress could react to the
Berger decision, the Court took the next logical step and for-
mally overruled Olmstead.56In Katz v. United States,57 the
petitioner was convicted of violating a federal statute prohib-
iting the telephonic transmission of wagering information
across state lines. 58 Tapes of petitioner's incriminating tele-
phone conversations, obtained by FBI agents through a re-
cording device placed outside a telephone booth, were used in
obtaining the conviction. 9 The petitioner, arguing that the
recordings were obtained in violation of his Fourth Amend-
ment rights, appealed.60
In overturning the conviction, the Court dismissed the
"trespass" doctrine articulated in Olmstead,61 holding that
"search and seizure" was not dependent upon a physical in-
trusion.6 2 Having recognized a Fourth Amendment right to a
reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone conversa-
tions, 63 the Court found the FBI's surveillance constitution-
ally deficient because it was not conducted pursuant to a
warrant.64
Congress quickly responded to the Berger and Katz deci-
sions. Seizing upon the wiretap recommendations of the 1967
Presidential Committee Report on Law Enforcement, 65 Con-
gress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 196866 ("Title III"). Mindful of the
Supreme Court's extension of constitutional protection to all
forms of electronic eavesdropping, Congress defined Title III's
dual purpose as: "(1) protecting the privacy of wire and oral
communications and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the
circumstances and conditions under which the interception of
wire and oral communications may be authorized."
67
56. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
57. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
58. Id. at 348.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 348-50.
61. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464, 466 (1928).
62. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 353 (1967).
63. Id. at 353.
64. Id. at 354-59.
65. See supra text accompanying note 42.
66. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20; Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1988)).
67. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1968).
[Vol. 37124
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In accordance with both the Commission's recommenda-
tions and the Supreme Court's 1967 decisions, Title III simul-
taneously forbade electronic surveillance by private parties6"
and authorized its narrow, regulated use by law enforcement
in specified criminal investigations.69 To assure comport-
ment with the Fourth Amendment's protections against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, Title III carefully deline-
ated the permissible situations and methods for conducting
wiretaps.7 °
1. Legal and Technical Implementation of Title III
Title III authorizes law enforcement agencies to install
wiretaps only after a judge makes an ex parte determination
that probable cause exists and that other investigative tech-
niques were or would be unavailing.71 The courts have ulti-
mately rejected all constitutional challenges to Title III's sur-
veillance criteria,7 2  indicating that the legislation
68. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1988).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1988). Offenses covered by Title III and delineated in
this section include: Extortion, corruption, interstate gambling, counterfeiting,
narcotics, unlawful use of explosives, and civil disorder. Id. Title III specifi-
cally addressed Federal law and did not generally affect state law, although
states were encouraged to enact similar statutes. See Philip H. Pennypacker,
Reach Out and Bug Someone: California's New Wiretap Law, 29 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 275, 279 & n.31 (1988).
70. See discussion infra part II.A.1.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1988). Specifically, the judge must determine
whether:
(a) There is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing,
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated
in section 2516 of this chapter;
(b) There is probable cause for belief that particular communications
concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception;
(c) Normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or be too
dangerous;
(d) There is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, or
the place where, the wire or oral communications are to be intercepted
are being used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or
are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by such person.
Id.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977); United States
v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1973). But see United States v. Whittaker, 343
F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1972), overruled by United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489
(3d Cir. 1973). See generally Pennypacker, supra note 69, at 280-99 (discussing
constitutional challenges to Title III).
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successfully meets the requirements imposed by Berger and
its progeny.73
Addressing technological compliance was a compara-
tively simple task. In 1968 the telecommunications industry
was a highly regulated field,"7 with AT&T and its subsidiar-
ies possessing a virtual monopoly on common carrier tele-
phone service. Wiretaps were easily implemented on the
basis of existing technology.76 System design was not an is-
sue because "intrinsic elements of wire lined networks
presented access points where law enforcement, with mini-
mum [sic] assistance from telephone companies," could exe-
cute wiretaps.7 7 When law enforcement did require tele-
phone company assistance, the issue was usually handled on
an ad hoc basis through private negotiation between the local
monopoly service provider and law enforcement.78
2. Initial Amendment of Title III
Notwithstanding the relative ease of all facets of wiretap-
ping under Title III, questions inevitably arose regarding the
degree of cooperation required between law enforcement and
telephone carriers. 79 Specifically, Title III as originally en-
acted provided no direct guidance regarding what responsi-
bility telecommunication carriers had to assist law enforce-
ment in executing authorized interceptions.8 0 When the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in
1970 that, absent carrier consent, law enforcement agencies
were not entitled to telephone carrier assistance in their
wiretapping endeavors,81 Congress returned to Title III.2
73. See supra text accompanying notes 48-64.
74. See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977).
75. See Eric J. Lerner, Telecommunications Industry, in COMPTON'S LIVING
ENCYCLOPEDIA, 1996, available in America Online, Reference File.
76. See infra notes 111-12.
77. 1994 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 13-14.
78. Id. at 14 (noting that such agreements had the disadvantage of being
concluded without public knowledge or legislative oversight).
79. See In re United States, 427 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1970). This case is dis-
cussed infra note 81 and accompanying text.
80. 1994 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 17.
81. In re United States, 427 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1970). In In re United
States, the FBI had asked a local telephone company to assist in effectuating an
authorized wiretap by providing leased lines and connecting bridges. Id. at 641
n.1. The telephone company refused and the FBI brought suit. Id.
82. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1988).
126 [Vol. 37
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Two months after the Ninth Circuit's decision, Congress
added a new provision to Title III addressing the required
carrier assistance question.83  The amendment mandated
that upon an applicant's request, orders authorizing wiretap-
ping direct the carrier to provide all information, facilities
and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the order.8 4
In return, the provision requires that the applicant (a govern-
ment entity) compensate the provider for reasonable ex-
penses incurred in providing such assistance.85
The United States Supreme Court addressed the 1970
amendment to Title III in United States v. New York Tele-
phone Co.8 6 The Court held the New York Telephone Com-
pany bound by a district court order requiring the company to
provide the FBI with technical assistance in executing a trace
on two telephones suspected of use in illegal gambling.
87
Noting that trace orders were not governed by Title III,"8 the
Supreme Court refused to base its decision on the 1970
amendment, relying instead on the inherent power provided
by the All Writs Act.89 Nevertheless, the Court interpreted
83. Id.
84. The provision reads in full:
An order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire, oral,
or electronic communication under this chapter shall, upon request of
the applicant, direct that a provider of wire or electronic communica-
tion service, landlord, custodian, or other person shall furnish the ap-
plicant forthwith all information, facilities, and technical assistance
necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a
minimum of interference with the services that such service provider,
landlord, custodian, or person is according the person whose communi-
cations are to be intercepted. Any provider of wire or electronic com-
munication service, landlord, custodian, or other person shall be com-
pensated therefor by the applicant for reasonable expenses incurred in
providing such facilities or assistance.
Id.
85. Id.
86. 434 U.S. 159, 176-77 & n.25 (1977).
87. Id. at 177-78.
88. Id. at 168. The Court stated: "It is clear that Congress did not view
(tracing devices) as posing a threat to privacy of the same dimension as the
interception of oral communications and did not intend to impose Title III re-
strictions upon their use." Id. The Court elsewhere explained that trace de-
vices did not pose as great a threat to privacy because they disclose "only the
telephone numbers that have been dialed" and "do not accomplish the 'aural
acquisition' of anything." Id. at 167.
89. Id. at 172. The All Writs Act states: "The Supreme Court and all courts
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in
aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usage's and principles
of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1988). The Court noted that it had consistently
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the amendment as commanding federal courts "to compel,
upon request, any assistance necessary to accomplish an elec-
tronic interception."90 The Court thus concluded that even if
Title III had applied, the 1970 amendment would lead to the
same result the Court reached under the All Writs Act: The
telephone company must cooperate in the investigation. 91
The Supreme Court's reasoning in New York Telephone
endorsed the validity and scope of the 1970 congressional
amendment to Title III.92 In so doing, the Court acknowl-
edged that private third parties, "who, though not parties to
the original action or engaged in wrongdoing, are in a posi-
tion to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the
proper administration of justice,"93 may be required to pro-
vide affirmative, compensated assistance to law enforcement
wiretap efforts.94
The strong deference accorded Title III in New York Tele-
phone was a natural outgrowth of the earlier praise the Court
bestowed upon Title III for striking a proper balance between
legitimate law enforcement interests and the privacy rights
of individuals.9" By the end of the 1970s it was clear that
applied the Act flexibly, in conformity with the principle that "[ulnless appro-
priately confined by Congress, a federal court may avail itself of all auxiliary
writs as aids in the performance of its duties, when the use of such historic aids
is calculated in its sound judgment to achieve the ends of justice entrusted to
it." United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172-73 (1977) (citation
omitted). See also In re United States, 610 F.2d 1148 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying
the All Writs Act to several separate telephone companies to require their
assistance in non-wiretap law enforcement surveillance in exchange for reason-
able compensation).
90. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 176-77.
91. Id. at 177 n.25.
92. Id. at 176-77. The Court further buttressed its acceptance of the 1970
Title III amendment by suggesting that the Ninth Circuit opinion (refusing to
compel telephone carrier assistance in the absence of specific statutory lan-
guage) that prompted the congressional amendment might have been wrongly
decided. Id. at 177 n.25. In essence, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
Title III might always have carried with it the authority to compel such assist-
ance, even without the 1970 amendment. See id.
93. Id. at 174.
94. Id. The decision was silent, however, regarding whether telephone com-
panies had a duty to install equipment solely to assist law enforcement wiretap
efforts. See 1994 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 13.
95. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 151 (1974). But cf Schwartz,
supra note 27, at 480-86 (criticizing Title III as overly broad); see Pennypacker,
supra note 69, at 281 (implying that praise for Title III found in cases such as
Kahn is unfounded).
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Title III represented an entrenched, judicially accepted law
enforcement tool.
B. Reform Takes Root: Between Title III and the DTA
1. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
Technology did not stand still following the passage of Ti-
tle III in 1968.96 As communications technology continued its
rapid growth into the 1980's, Congress recognized a need for
further legislative action.97 Feeling compelled "to preserve 'a
fair balance between the privacy expectations of citizens and
the legitimate needs of law enforcement"' in the face of rapid
technological change, 98 Congress passed the Electronic Com-
munications Privacy Act of 1986 99 ("ECPA").
The ECPA amended Title III's protections against pri-
vate party eavesdropping and its law enforcement surveil-
lance provisions to encompass new and emerging technolo-
gies, such as electronic mail, cellular telephones, paging
devices and fiber optics. 100 The new act thus largely served
96. See infra text accompanying notes 99, 105-21.
97. Patrick J. Leahy, New Laws for New Technologies: Current Issues Fac-
ing the Subcommittee on Technology and the Law, 5 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1, 11
(1992).
98. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRI-
VACY ACT OF 1986, H.R. REP. No. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1986).
99. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-21 (1988).
100. 1994 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 12. See also S. REP. No. 541, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1986) ("As a general rule, a communication is an electronic
communication protected by [this law] if it is not carried by sound waves and
cannot fairly be characterized as containing the human voice.... This term also
includes electronic mail, digitized transmissions, and video teleconferencing.").
Title III and the ECPA only apply to transmissions affecting interstate
commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1988). However, transmissions affecting inter-
state commerce have long been held to incorporates nearly all transmissions
through normal common carrier lines. See, e.g., Ratterman v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 127 U.S. 411 (1888); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460
(1880). Nevertheless, the interstate commerce requirement may exclude some
transmissions carried solely within one state or one building (e.g. corporate e-
mail) from federal law. See Michael W. Droke, Private, Legislative, and Judi-
cial Options for Clarification of Employee Rights to the Contents of their Elec-
tronic Mail Systems, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 173 (1992). This difference has
very little implication on the topic of this comment since only the Federal legal-
ity of the Digital Telephony Act is reviewed. The difference might affect state
interpretations of the DTA, and it has implications on other privacy matters.
See generally ROBERT E. SMITH, COMPILATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE PRIVACY
LAws (1988). For an analysis of the privacy implications of corporate e-mail
policies see Droke, supra, at 167.
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as a stop gap measure,' 0 1 extending Title III's existing legal
provisions to new technologies without considering how these
technological changes might require different legal re-
sponses. 10 2 It soon became evident that the ECPA's exten-
sion of existing law had not kept pace with new challenges
created by technological change. 10 3
2. The Effect of Changing Telephone Technology on
Wiretap Capabilities
When AT&T introduced its first cellular phones in the
1980s it predicted there would be 900,000 cellular phones in
the United States by the year 2000.104 By 1993, the actual
figure was already 13,000,000, with 60,000,000 projected by
the year 2000.105 The exponential boom in cellular technol-
ogy mirrors the expansion of telecommunications technology
generally, exemplified by services such as call forwarding,
speed-dialing and digital fiber optic cable.
10 6
Such technology provides amazing new telecommunica-
tion speed, quality, convenience, and privacy, 0 7 but it also
impedes law enforcement's ability to gain access through con-
101. Although the goal of the ECPA was to keep Title III current, subsequent
events proved the Act woefully inadequate in this regard. See discussion infra
parts II.B.2-B.4.
102. See infra parts II.B.2-B.4.
103. See discussion infra part II.B.2.
104. Transcript of Remarks by Vice President Gore at the National Press
Club, U.S. Newswire, Dec. 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File.
105. Id.
106. In this comment, the term "digital fiber optics" refers to the glass cables
that transmit digital transmissions. Capabilities such as call waiting, that al-
lows customers to have two or more calls on the same line at once, and call
forwarding, that allows customers to automatically forward their calls to an-
other location, are available on both analog and digital systems, having become
increasingly prevalent in recent years. See generally 1994 HousE REPORT,
supra note 6, at 12 (noting that the difficulty in intercepting modern telecom-
munications is not limited to the inability to decode'digital transmissions, but is
also related to increased telecommunications traffic and services utilizing both
digital and analog systems, which limits the ability to isolate particular
conversations).
107. Privacy is increased through digital transmissions which are much
more difficult to intercept than traditional analog transmissions. See infra text
accompanying notes 111-20. Privacy is also increased by improved encryption
techniques that are made possible through digital technology. See discussion
infra notes 159-60.
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ventional wiretapping techniques.10 8  As noted above,
although the ECPA expanded the ambit of Title III to cover
many of these emerging technologies, it did nothing to change
how law enforcement obtains access to these transmis-
sions. 10 9 To understand why accessing the new mediums is
difficult using the conventional wiretaps implemented under
Title III,110 it is useful to review the technology involved.
Conventional wiretapping involves intercepting a trans-
mission by connecting to a source point anywhere along the
transmission path."' By simply donning a set of earphones
and attaching a pair of alligator clips to a telephone line, a
"tapper" is able to listen directly into selected conversa-
tions." 2 Digital transmissions, using computer code to trans-
fer conversations, rather than the electric pulses used in ana-
log systems," 3 makes this traditional wiretapping technique
ineffective." 4 A wiretapper using alligator clips on a digital
system would hear only the binary hiss of thousands of jum-
bled conversations.
1 5
108. One survey compiled by the FBI found 183 incidents where law enforce-
ment's wiretap efforts failed due to technological constraints. 1994 HOUSE RE-
PORT, supra note 6, at 15 (identifying, among others: 54 incidents due to lack of
cellular port capacity, 33 incidents where audio could not be captured contem-
poraneous with the digits dialed, and 42 incidents of problems involving Call
Back, inability to isolate a particular digital transmission, and other problems).
109. See supra part II.B.1.
110. Title III, by not placing any design requirements on carrier's equip-
ment, essentially requires law enforcement to rely on traditional methods of
tapping. See infra text accompanying notes 112-21. The only way to gain ac-
cess to some digital and other high-tech transmissions, or to isolate a particular
call on a network handling thousands of calls simultaneously, is through adap-
tation of the actual receiving equipment owned and operated by the telephone
companies. 1994 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 12.
111. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 46 (1967).
112. Nightline: FBI, Pushing for Enhanced Wiretap Powers (ABC television
broadcast, May 22, 1992), available in LEXIS, News Library, SCRIPT File
[hereinafter Nightline].
113. The term "digital transmissions" can be described as transmissions con-
sisting of electronic information converted into streams of digital bits. Jaleen
Nelson, Comment, Sledge Hammers and Scalpels: The FBI Digital Wiretap Bill
and Its Effect on Free Flow of Information and Privacy, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1139
n.1 (1994). Bits (short for binary digits) are on-off conditions representing the
digits "0" and "1" as read by computers. Id. Using this binary system, digital
fiber optic cable enables telecommunication equipment to carry thousands of
conversations (translated into binary computer code) over a single cable. Night-
line, supra note 112.
114. See Nightline, supra note 112.
115. Id.
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This "digitized chatter" arises because digital transmis-
sions are not reconstructed into recognizable sounds until
just before the call reaches the receiver's ear. 116 By way of
contrast, traditional analog networks utilize electronic pulses
mimicking natural sound waves rather than converting those
sounds into computer code. 117 While analog transmissions
are amplified by the user's own telephone without requiring
any decoding, digital transmissions must pass through com-
plex decoding equipment at the carrier's central office before
they become intelligible to the human ear. 1" As a result, dig-
ital transmissions present no convenient area for interception
other than at the carrier's central office.'1 9 Law enforce-
ment's concern is that unless its members are provided access
to carrier central offices equipped with decoders capable of
isolating individual conversations, the ability to conduct
wiretaps as provided by Title III will disappear.120
3. The Telecommunications Task Force
In 1990, while law enforcement worried about its powers
under Title III and the ECPA becoming obsolete, privacy ad-
vocates simultaneously worried that Title III and the ECPA
failed to recognize key emerging privacy interests.121 The
ECPA, passed only four years earlier, was already becoming
dated.1 22 The newly formed congressional Subcommittee on
Technology and the Law organized a task force to reexamine
the ECPA's privacy protections in light of emerging
technologies. 123
116. Id.
117. Nelson, supra note 113, at 27. Additionally, because analog sound uses
more space and requires greater amounts of electricity, the capacity of analog
systems is much less than the newer digital systems; as capacity increases, iso-
lating calls to meet the "particularity" requirement of the Fourth Amendment
becomes much more difficult. Id. See also infra text accompanying note 31.
118. Nightline, supra note 112.
119. Id.
120. Id. See infra text accompanying note 251-56.
121. See infra text accompanying note 125.
122. See supra part II.B.2. See also infra text accompanying note 125.
123. 1994 HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 12. Titled "The Privacy and Tech-
nology Task Force," it was formed by Senator Patrick Leahy, chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology and the Law. Id. This task
force, comprised of experts from business, consumer advocacy groups, law, and
civil liberties groups, was created "to examine current developments in commu-
nication technology and the extent to which the law in general, and ECPA, spe-
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The task force noted that while the ECPA brought many
types of electronic communications within the ambit of Title
III, the ECPA failed to anticipate several important techno-
logical developments. 124 For example, the legal protections of
the ECPA did not extend to certain wireless data communica-
tion devices such as cellular laptop computers, wireless local
area networks (commonly referred to as LANs), and cordless
phones.12 5 In the spring of 1991, the task force recommended
incorporating these emerging wireless technologies into the
privacy protections of the ECPA.126 Despite the Task Force's
recommendations and the ongoing concerns of law enforce-
ment, Congress took no immediate action.
4. FBI Involvement
a. Covert FBI Action
Concerned that increasing access difficulties 127 would
thwart criminal investigations dependent upon court-ap-
proved wiretaps, the FBI felt it could no longer wait for a con-
gressional response.128 From 1991 through 1992, the FBI
embarked on a secret campaign designed to maintain the
level of wiretap access it deemed essential to fulfilling its law
enforcement duties.' 2 9 Code-named "Operation Root Ca-
nal,"' 30 the FBI campaign sought to improve digital wiretap
access through a cooperative, private alliance between law
enforcement and telecommunication carriers.'
3
'
By explaining to telecommunication carriers the diffi-
culty involved in executing court-approved wiretaps on digi-
tal communications, the FBI hoped to induce the carriers' vol-
cifically, protected, or failed adequately to protect, personal and corporate pri-
vacy." Id.
124. 1994 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 12-13.
125. Id. at 12.
126. Id.
127. See supra note 108 for FBI-gathered statistics on technology-based im-
pediments to wiretapping encountered by law enforcement agencies.
128. See Nelson, supra note 113, at 1141.
129. Id. The FBI has continuously maintained that guaranteed access to all
telephonic communications subject to Title III is essential for it to effectively
combat organized crime and sophisticated drug dealers. Nightline, supra note
112.
130. See FBI's Digital Telephony Bill Was Result of Failed 2-Year Behind-
Scenes Campaign, COMMON CARRIER WEEK (Warren Publishing, Inc.), Nov. 29,
1993 [hereinafter Behind-Scenes Campaign].
131. Behind-Scenes Campaign, supra note 130.
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untarily cooperation. 13 2 Specifically, the FBI requested law
enforcement access to the carriers' central office switches.
13 3
As an inducement, the FBI identified potential weaknesses to
the network security of the telephone companies that would
be difficult for the FBI to prevent without wiretap access.
13 4
The FBI also provided a cost-benefit study, detailing the fi-
nancial impact of digital wiretap access on the industry.1 3 5
Telecommunication carriers, mindful of the industry's re-
cent escape from a long history of government regulation,
1 3 6
eventually preferred the silent, cooperative agreement pro-
posed by the FBI over a legislative solution. 137 Additionally,
carriers feared offending the FBI because of the FBI's rela-
tionship with the Justice Department, which exercised con-
siderable control over telecommunication carriers as part of
the industry's deregulation. 1
3
As when Title III was first enacted, the telephone compa-
nies envisioned a silent partnership with law enforcement
that avoided close public and governmental scrutiny as well
as costly court battles. 39 Unlike the late 1960's through the
1970's, however, the telephone companies were no longer di-
vided into monopolistic local service providers with complete
control over their individual markets. 4 ° Competitive reali-
ties led the carriers to fear that unless universal compliance
was somehow assured, competitors would not follow the
terms of any agreement, leaving those that did at a disadvan-
tage.' 4 1 Additionally, one senior industry official confided
that carriers worried that the FBI scheme would cost them
millions of dollars with no commensurate benefit, leaving the
FBI as the only true beneficiary.
42
Thus, although later opposed to legislation, the carriers'
previous opposition to cooperating with the FBI was an ac-
knowledgement that legislation may be the only way for the
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. While the FBI denied the existence of such a study, FBI documents
obtained through the Freedom of Information Act indicated its existence. Id.
136. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
137. Behind-Scenes Campaign, supra note 130.
138. Id.
139. Id. See also supra text accompanying note 78.
140. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
141. Behind-Scenes Campaign, supra note 130.
142. Id.
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FBI to attain industry-wide compliance with its access re-
quirements. 143 Discussions dragged on, but no resolution ac-
ceptable to both sides was forthcoming.
1 4 4
b. Introduction and Rejection of FBI Legislative
Initiatives
When private lobbying of the industry failed to produce
increased wiretap access, FBI director William Sessions, and
later his successor, Louis Freeh, turned to legislation. 48 The
FBI began lobbying congressional leaders with law enforce-
ment concerns,' 46 and a bill addressing the digital wiretap-
ping issue was first proposed by the FBI in the fall of 1992.147
However, even with support from the Bush Administration
and high priority from Director Sessions, 14 the FBI legisla-
tion immediately encountered widespread criticism and
opposition. 14
9
Groups opposed to the legislation banded together to ex-
press their disapproval. Trade associations, such as the
USTA; major companies, including AT&T, IBM, GTE, and
Microsoft; and civil liberties organizations like the ACLU,
sent a letter to Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Er-
nest Hollings, stating that no legislation was necessary be-
cause they were willing to work voluntarily with law enforce-
ment officials to reach a satisfactory solution. 150 However,
the groups' disparate rationales for opposing the legislation
seemed to foreclose any hope that a cooperative, non-legisla-
tive approach would resolve the dilemma.
15
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Sessions and Attorney General William Barr met with Senate Com-
merce Committee Chairman Ernest Hollings (D-SC) to urge his support of the
proposed legislation in May of 1992. Simson L. Garfinkle, New Phones Stymie
FBI Wiretaps, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Apr. 29, 1992, at 12. In April of 1992,
Sessions appeared before the House Judiciary Subcommittee to explain the gov-
ernment's position on the proposed Bill. Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage
to U.S. Corporations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Economic and Commer-
cial Law of the House Judiciary Comm., 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1992).
147. Garfinkle, supra note 146, at 12.
148. Nightline, supra note 112.
149. Id.
150. Garfinkle, supra note 146, at 12.
151. As previously noted, the FBI had already sought and failed to reach a
private solution with the telephone industry. See supra part II.B.4.a. There-
fore, the subsequent proposals to solve the problem through private cooperation
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The FBI legislation, throughout its various incarnations,
even attracted the ire of eventual proponents of the DTA.' 5 2
The House sponsor of the DTA, Representative Don Edwards
of California, described the FBI legislation as "both a civil lib-
erties nightmare and a drag on development of new technolo-
gies and services."153 Despite continuous and renewed lobby-
ing efforts by new FBI Director Louis Freeh and the Clinton
Administration,15 4 criticism against the FBI legislation re-
mained steadfast throughout 1993 and into 1994.1 5
The first drafts of the bill raised intense opposition and,
failing to gain a congressional sponsor, were quietly with-
drawn. 156 Among the most contentious provisions of the FBI
legislation were requirements that no new communications
technologies be introduced that were not wiretap accessi-
ble,' 57 and that all telecommunication transmissions be wire-
tap accessible without exception, including electronic mail,
on-line services such as Prodigy, and private branch exten-
sions ("PBXs").15 8 Indications that under the FBI proposals
citizens would not be allowed to encrypt their conversations
to circumvent interception, 59 or at least would not be guar-
anteed that right, further fueled opposition.
160
rather than legislation, appeared at best futile, if not disingenuous. The dispa-
rate interests of those opposed to a legislative solution spanned from the corpo-
rate interest in avoiding bottom-line financial implications, to civil liberties
groups concerned with the threat of increased governmental intrusion into indi-
vidual privacy. See infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 153.
153. Edwards Announces Compromise on "Digital Telephony" Legislation,
Congressman Don Edwards News Release, Aug. 9, 1994 (on file with author)
[hereinafter Edwards Announces Compromise].
154. See Nelson, supra note 113, at 1142-43.
155. See, e.g., FBI's Digital Wiretap Bill assailed in GSA Internal Docu-
ments, COMMON CARRIER WEEK, Jan. 25, 1993, at 4; Nelson, supra note 113, at
1178-79.
156. See Nelson, supra note 113, at 1142.
157. Id. at 1141-42.
158. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, AN ANALYSIS OF THE FBI DIGITAL
TELEPHONE PRoPOSAL 3, at 2-3 (1992). See also Nelson, supra note 113, at 1178-
79 & n.213.
159. Encryption would not prevent interception, but could significantly im-
pede the usefulness of any encrypted conversations intercepted. See Ira D.
Moskatel, Protecting Electronic Communications, L.A. LAw., June 1993, at 31-
51.
160. Nelson, supra note 113, at 1139-41. This concern relates to the "Clipper
Chip" or "Key Escrow Program" encryption standards as promulgated by the
Clinton Administration. See id. (discussing generally the "Clipper Chip" propo-
sal). These encryption proposals are beyond the scope of this comment and do
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Opponents uniformly criticized the FBI's provisions as
over-broad. 16 1  Industry representatives forcefully argued
that forbidding the introduction of technology that is not
wiretap accessible would severely hinder competitiveness
and impede technological development. 162 The telecommuni-
cations and information services industries comprise the fast-
est growing sectors of the United States economy, accounting
for over twelve percent of the Gross Domestic Product.
163
Whether founded or not, the fear that the flow of new technol-
ogies fueling this sector of the economy may be reduced by
the FBI's requirements, increased the opposition to the FBI
proposals. 164
On the civil liberties side, opponents of the FBI legisla-
tion argued that requiring all forms of telecommunications to
be wiretap accessible amounted to an undue (and unconstitu-
tional) restriction on privacy. 165 In essence, opponents from
all sides argued that the broadness of the FBI proposals of-
fended every vestige of Title III's original dual purpose: pro-
tecting privacy and carefully delineating the circumstances
and conditions under which such privacy could be
abridged. 166
C. The Digital Telephony Act
The DTA was the end product of over two years of in-
tense debate following the FBI's initial digital wiretap access
proposals. 16 7 As such, the DTA's House sponsor touts the Act
as a compromise among civil liberties organizations, privacy
not affect the DTA, which specifically guarantees the right to use encryption.
See Memorandum from Don Edwards, supra note 11. See also infra note 183.
For an excellent discussion of encryption generally, see Moskatel, supra
note 159. For a more technical description of encryption techniques and a cri-
tique of the Clipper Chip proposal see Martin E. Hellman, Implications of En-
cryption Policy on the National Information Infrastructure, 11 COMPUTER LAW.,
Feb. 1994, at 28.
161. See Nelson, supra note 113, at 1160-61.
162. Id.
163. Transcript of Remarks by Vice President Gore at the National Press
Club, supra note 104.
164. See Nelson, supra note 113, at 1160-61.
165. 1994 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 23. Most of these networks had
either never posed a problem for law enforcement in the past or, as in the case
of financial networks, are already subject to disclosure through other mecha-
nisms, such as federal banking laws. Id.
166. See supra note 67.
167. Memorandum from Don Edwards, supra note 11.
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advocates, law enforcement agencies, as well as congressional
and industrial leaders during the preceding two years.
168
However, at least one telephone industry representative
takes issue with that statement, claiming the DTA "does not
represent a consensus of opinion between industry, business
and the government."' 6 9
Wherever the truth lies, the 1994 House Report on the
DTA does identify three key interests which the Digital Te-
lephony Act seeks to balance: "(1) to preserve a narrowly fo-
cused capability for law enforcement agencies to carry out
properly authorized intercepts; (2) to protect privacy in the
face of increasingly powerful and personally revealing tech-
nologies; and (3) to avoid impeding the development of new
communications services and technologies." 170 By any stan-
dard, this is a more diverse set of interests than encompassed
by earlier FBI proposals. 171 These interests are addressed by
a number of statutory provisions within the Act,' 72 as dis-
cussed below.
1. Preserving Wiretap Capabilities in Light of
Changing Technology
To preserve law enforcement wiretap capability, the Act
requires telecommunication carriers to ensure their systems
have the capability to:
(1) Isolate expeditiously the content of targeted com-
munications within the carrier's service area;
(2) Isolate expeditiously information identifying the
origination and destination numbers of targeted
communications, but not their physical location;
(3) Provide intercepted communications and call
identifying information in a format so they may
be transmitted over lines leased by law enforce-
ment away from the carrier's premises; and
168. Edwards Announces Compromise, supra note 153. Specifically, House
Sponsor Don Edwards described the DTA as a compromise between the FBI,
the United States Telephone Association, the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
and the Digital Telephony Working Group. Id.
169. Senate Panel Amends Wiretap Bill to Address Industry Concerns, Daily
Report for Executives, Sept. 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File.
170. 1994 HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 13.
171. See supra part II.B.4.b.
172. See infra text accompanying notes 173, 186.
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(4) Carry out intercepts unobtrusively. 173
These requirements are designed to assure that the DTA
comports with the Fourth Amendment particularity stan-
dards set forth in Berger and Katz, as well as the original Ti-
tle III requirements. 174 The 1994 House Report specifically
recognizes that only telecommunication carriers are required
to meet the design requirements of the Act.
175
Thus, unlike the FBI's proposals, the DTA does not re-
quire providers of on-line services or the Internet to assure
their systems are designed to allow law enforcement wiretap
access. 176 Also exempted from the Act's system requirements
are PBXs and any other closed networks (such as automatic
teller machines). 177 Agreeing that previously proposed FBI
legislation was over-broad and impractical in this area, the
1994 House Report acknowledged that a more expansive ap-
proach was not justified by any current law enforcement
need. 178
2. Privacy Provisions
Several sections of the DTA specifically address privacy,
the second enumerated interest in the 1994 House Report.'
7 9
Among the more important provisions is one securing greater
173. See 18 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)-(4) (1994). Note that provision (2) also pro-
vides an increased privacy right by forbidding law enforcement from obtaining
tracking or location information aside from the phone number itself without
specific court approval as described in Title III. 18 US.C. § 2602 (a)(2). Cur-
rently, location information in some cellular systems may be obtained through
transactional data revealed by trace devices. See 1994 HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 6, at 17. Since not "wiretaps," such traces could be conducted through the
use of subpoenas, a notably lower threshold than the ex parte court approval
required under Title III. See id. See also United States v. New York Tel. Co.,
434 U.S. 159, 165-68 (1977) (holding that pen registers, the devices used to
trace calls, do not fall within the ambit of Title III).
174. See supra parts II.A.1, II.A.l.a. The assistance requirements are specif-
ically designed to preserve the status-quo as it existed previously under Title
III. 1994 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 22.
175. 1994 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 18. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2601
(1994).
176. 1994 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 18. Of course, these systems are
still subject to wiretapping in accordance with Title III, but the carriers do not
have to meet any system design requirements. The intent is to essentially limit
the design modification requirements to common carrier voice-call networks.
Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See supra text accompanying note 170.
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privacy for transactional electronic communications (e.g.,
electronic mail), by requiring a court order before law en-
forcement can intercept such transmissions. 180 Title III re-
quired only a subpoena to tap into transactional data.181 The
DTA also extends the privacy provisions of the ECPA to cor-
dless telephones and certain data transmitted by radio. 182
Finally, unlike the FBI's initiatives, the Act explicitly does
not limit the right for subscribers to use encryption. 83
3. Competitiveness and Funding: Regulatory
Provisions
In addition to the new privacy protections, a third key
interest incorporated into the legislation pertains to the tele-
communications industry competitiveness and the Act's fund-
ing requirements.18 One of the major industry objections to
the preceding FBI initiatives was that the proposed legisla-
tive requirements placed too high of a financial and competi-
tive burden on the telecommunication industry.8 5 The DTA
addresses these concerns by:
(1) Providing funds over a four year period for carri-
ers to retrofit equipment so as to comply with the
law;
(2) Excusing any equipment from compliance that
was installed at the time of enactment but which
the government did not provide funds for bring-
ing within the Act's requirements;
(3) Allowing the industry to set its own standards
regarding how to meet the wiretap access re-
quirements, with oversight by the FCC; and
(4) Not restricting any new technologies/equipment
that are not reasonably capable of being made
wiretap accessible.18 6
180. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (1994).
181. 1994 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 17-18.
182. Id.
183. 18 U.S.C. § 2602(b)(3) (1994). Cf supra text accompanying notes 159-
60 (indicating that FBI proposals would not protect encryption rights).
184. See supra text accompanying note 170.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 161-64.
186. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2606, 2608 (1994).
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Although the statute appears to place the determination
of standards in the hands of the industry,18 the statute goes
on to state that any "government agency" (e.g., the FBI) or
"person" may petition the FCC to establish binding technical
standards if the industries' standards are deemed "deficient"
in light of the DTA's goals.18
Under the terms of the Act, the government has
earmarked $500 million over the first four years of the Act for
the industry to retrofit existing equipment in compliance
with the law.'8 9 After the initial four year transition period,
carriers themselves must bear the cost of ensuring that any
new equipment and services installed for the carrier's own
business needs comply with the design requirements. 190
However, this "mandatory" compliance is only required to the
extent it is "reasonable."' 91
In determining reasonableness, "the cost to the carrier of
compliance compared to the carrier's overall cost of develop-
ing or acquiring ... the feature ... in question" is one factor
to be considered. 192 Apparently, the aim is to guarantee that
the cost of compliance imposed on the carrier is de minimis in
order to avoid a finding of an unconstitutional government
taking of private property under the Fifth Amendment.
193
Any equipment installed solely to meet government capacity
requests rather than legitimate business needs will be paid
by the government, even after the initial four year period. 1
94
The government argues that any additional cost imposed
on carriers in meeting the Act's requirements will be de
minimis because the requirement that all carriers comply
with the law will bring down the cost of manufacturing com-
plying components. 195 The telephone companies argue that
187. See text accompanying note 185. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2606(a) (1994).
188. 18 U.S.C. § 2606(b) (1994).
189. 18 U.S.C. § 2608 (1994).
190. 18 U.S.C. § 2608(b) (1994).
191. Id. The section states that in considering if capability requirements are
reasonably achievable, "consideration shall be given to the time when the
equipment... was installed or deployed." 18 U.S.C. § 2608(b)-2 (1994).
192. 1994 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 19.
193. See discussion infra parts II.C.4.b, IV.C-D. The Fifth Amendment
states, in relevant part, "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
194. 18 U.S.C. § 2608 (1994). See also 1994 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at
17.
195. 1994 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 49.
19961
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the government should reimburse telecommunications prov-
iders for all "reasonable" costs of compliance, no matter how
or when they are incurred. 196 Argues one telecommunica-
tions spokesman, "In addition to the costs associated with re-
trofitting existing equipment, there are costs involved with
building surveillance capability into new equipment. Con-
trary to statements made by the FBI, it is not clear that such
costs would be de minimis."'97
4. Constitutional Issues
The core legal debate between supporters and opponents
of the DTA focuses on the Act's constitutional implications.
Opponents claim that despite the privacy provisions included
in the Act, the legislation is anathema to established privacy
rights. 19 Specifically, these opponents argue that the Act: (1)
impermissibly makes private entities (the telephone carriers)
agents of law enforcement, and (2) impermissibly mandates
that a means of communication be designed to facilitate gov-
ernment interception. 99 Furthermore, some in the telephone
industry question the legality of the funding provisions in-
cluded within the legislation.200 Roy Neel, President and
CEO of an industry trade organization, believes these fund-
ing provisions might constitute an uncompensated taking of
private property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.20 '
a. Individual Privacy: Fourth Amendment Issues
Under the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970,202 banks are re-
quired to maintain records of their customers' banking activi-
196. Cost of Wiretap Bill Examined at House Subcommittee Hearing, DAILY
REPORT FOR ExEcuTIvEs, Sept. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File.
197. Id. The industry argues that since the DTA is solely a tool for law en-
forcement, "if they want it, they should pay for it." Senate Panel Amends Wire-
tap Bill to Address Industry Concerns, DAILY REPORT FOR ExEcuTwVEs, Sept. 29,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. Especially disturbing
to the industry is the notion of "being forced to incur additional costs for some-
thing in which there is no market value." Id.
198. Electronic Lobbying on Digital Telephony, NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWOR,
Aug. 30, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
199. Id.
200. Digital Telephony (Wiretap) Bill Clears Congress, COMM. DAILY, Oct. 12,
1994, at 2.
201. Id.
202. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-59 (1986) and 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-62,
1081-83, 1101-05, 1121-22 (1986).
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ties and make such records available to the government upon
proper legal request.20 3 In California Bankers Ass'n v.
Shultz,2 °4 the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality
of the Bank Secrecy Act's requirements. The Court found no
Fourth Amendment infirmities in the law.20 5 Noting that
Congress was within its power to regulate the important
problem of crime in interstate commerce, the Court held that
the mere requirement that banks maintain records was also
within Congress' power since the government could only se-
cure access to such records by following proper legal proce-
dures. 0 6 The Court additionally held that the cost of compli-
ance with the Act was not unreasonable, and therefore no
abrogation of Fifth Amendment rights occurred.20 7 The
Court concluded:
We do not think it is strange or irrational that Congress,
having its attention called to what appeared to be serious
and organized efforts to avoid detection of criminal activ-
ity, should have legislated to rectify the situation. We
have no doubt that Congress, in the sphere of its legisla-
tive authority, may just as properly address itself to the
effective enforcement of criminal laws which it has previ-
ously enacted as to the enactment of those laws in the first
instance.20 8
One argument distinguishing the requirements of the
DTA from those at issue in the Bank Secrecy Act is that the
technology necessary for banks to comply with the Act in
question was already possessed by the banks.209 The banks
were only required to supply information that was already
maintained in the scope of business.21 0 Unlike telephone car-
riers under the DTA, banks were not required under the
Bank Secrecy Act to install any new equipment solely to com-
ply with the Act.211 Accordingly, opponents of the DTA would
argue that any reliance by the DTA's supporters on the
203. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 26-27 (1974).
204. Id. at 25.
205. Id. at 52, 77.
206. Id. at 52-54.
207. Id. at 50.
208. California Bankers Ass'n, 416 U.S. at 77.
209. Id. at 50 n.22.
210. Id. at 52-54.
211. Id. at 49 n.21.
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Shultz Court's finding of no Fifth Amendment (takings) viola-
tion is misplaced.2" 2
In a dissenting opinion in Shultz,2"3 Justice Douglas
compared the Act to a hypothetical law requiring telephone
companies "to record and retain all telephone calls and make
them available to any federal agency on request."21 4 Justice
Douglas had no trouble concluding that such a law would vio-
late the Fourth Amendment.21 5 Believing the Bank Secrecy
Act sufficiently analogous to his hypothetical, Douglas argued
that the Act should be struck down.21 6
b. The Takings Question: Fifth Amendment Issues
Several U.S. Supreme Court decisions provide an over-
view of the Fifth Amendment issues applicable to the DTA
debate, which are beyond the peripheral discussion provided
in Shultz. 21 7 In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp.,21 8 a New York law required landlords to allow the in-
stallation of cable television on their premises without any
form of government compensation. 21 9 Holding that the New
York law constituted a regulatory taking,22 ° the U.S.
Supreme Court established the principle that a regulatory
law amounting to any form of permanent physical occupation
was a per se taking requiring compensation. 22  The Court
further stressed that this was true no matter how strong the
government's countervailing interest.
222
Exactly what constitutes a permanent physical occupa-
tion under the Loretto test is uncertain.2 23 In Loretto, the
212. See discussion infra part IV.D.
213. California Bankers Ass'n, 416 U.S. at 79-91 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
214. Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 89-90 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
216. Id. at 90-91 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
217. See infra notes 218-41 and accompanying text.
218. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
219. Id. at 420.
220. See id. at 432, 441.
221. Id. at 432.
222. Id. at 434-35.
223. See Nathaniel S. Lawrence, Property Rights: Are There Any Left?, in
REGULATORY TAKING: THE LIMIT OF LAND USE CONTROLS, 203, 203-04 (G. Rich-
ard Hill ed., 1990). Historically (prior to the permanent physical occupation
test announced in Loretto), the Court viewed alleged takings fitting into one of
two categories: (1) harm prevention, which was never a taking, and (2) benefit
acquisition, which was always a taking. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,
668-69 (1887).
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Court narrowly characterized requiring fixed structures on
real property as an acquisition amounting to permanent
physical occupation.224 However, the Court has since ex-
panded the notion of permanent physical occupation.2 25
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,226 the Court
found that conditioning the issuance of a building permit on
the owners' granting a public easement amounted to a per-
manent physical occupation.227 The Court emphasized that
although no single individual could stay on such an easement
for long, the fact that the property might continually have
members of the public on it constituted a per se physical occu-
pation amounting to a taking.
22 1
Nevertheless, the Court indicated that a permanent
physical occupation of the sort found in Nollan might not re-
quire compensation if the condition furthers the same govern-
mental interest advanced for prohibiting the use itself.
229
Under the Nollan facts, the Court did not find a sufficiently
direct nexus between the Nollans' building plans and the
need for public access to justify an uncompensated taking.23 °
When the government institutes a regulation not involv-
ing a permanent physical occupation, the Court applies a
two-prong test developed in Agins v. City of Tiburon231 to de-
224. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 437
(1982).
225. See discussion infra accompanying notes 226-30. But see FCC v. Florida
Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987). In Florida Power, the U.S. Supreme Court
overruled a lower court finding of a per se Loretto occupation. Id. at 250. Specif-
ically, the Court found that a decision by the FCC to lower the rates utilities
charged cable television stations for running cables on utility company poles
was not a taking, since nothing prevented the utilities from excluding the cable
companies from use of the poles entirely. Id. at 251. Thus, the absence of re-
quired acquiescence defeated the utilities claims. Id. at 252.
226. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
227. See Id. at 832. Nollan involved a couple who wished to rebuild their
ocean front home. Id. at 827-28. The California Coastal Commission refused to
issue the required permits unless the Nollans agreed to grant a public access
easement across their property. Id. at 828. The California Court of Appeal up-
held the easement requirement and the Nollans appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Id. at 830-31.
228. Id. at 832.
229. Id. at 836-38.
230. See id. at 831-37. Moreover, the Nollan Court emphasized that the pro-
posed easement was not required to protect the interests espoused by the State.
Id. at 838-40.
231. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). InAgins, petitioner argued that a local zoning ordi-
nance would effect a taking, since he could no longer use the property as con-
templated when purchased. Id. at 260.
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termine whether the regulation is a compensable taking. In
order for a regulation that is not a permanent physical occu-
pation to avoid categorization as a taking, the regulation: (1)
must "substantially advance legitimate state interests," or (2)
must not "den[y] an owner economically viable use of his
land."23
2
The government's interest in controlling crime and ap-
prehending criminals has continually been recognized as sig-
nificant,2 33 but the deprivation of economic use is a less dis-
tinct issue. In determining whether an owner's property
expectations are impaired, courts have analyzed, among
other factors: (1) the past regulatory history of the prop-
erty;2 3 4 (2) whether existing uses were permitted to con-
tinue;235 (3) the general power of the government to regu-
late;236 and(4) the harshness of the local regulatory and legal
climate.237
Although interference with a landowner's "reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations" can constitute a taking,
238
deprivation of property rights alone is insufficient to meet the
"heavy burden" of establishing a regulatory taking.239 Fur-
thermore, the investment-backed expectations test has been
interpreted very strictly.240 Accordingly, in the absence of
physical occupation, to successfully challenge a land-use reg-
232. Id. at 260. The Court later expanded the notion of"economically viable
use" to include profit. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamil-
ton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 200 (1985) (noting that whether a regulation consti-
tutes a taking depends in significant part on the regulation's effect on the pri-
vate entities' "profit-backed expectations.").
233. See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548,
558, 562 (1914); Calhoun v. Massie, 253 U.S. 170, 175 (1920). Similar power
has been recognized as applying to the Federal Government as a "necessary and
proper" exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g.,
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
234. See Levy v. City of Cherry Hills Village, 666 F. Supp. 201, 203 (D. Colo.
1987).
235. Macleod v. County of Santa Clara, 749 F.2d 541, 547 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1009 (1985).
236. Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1033 (3d
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987), reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1040 (1987).
237. See Oceanic California, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 497 F. Supp. 962, 974
(N.D. Cal. 1980).
238. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978),
reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1979).
239. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 493
(1987).
240. See infra text accompanying note 241.
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ulation as a regulatory taking, it now appears that a plaintiff
must show both: "(1) it is not merely difficult, but impossible
to make a profit on the land as restricted; and (2) the regula-
tion does not serve a legitimate, general, and substantial pub-
lic interest."24 1
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The enactment of Title III nearly thirty years ago was
prompted by a desire to balance the legitimate needs of law
enforcement with the privacy rights of individuals. 242 As the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in United States v. Ka-
lustian,2 43 "[t]he restraint with which such authority was cre-
ated reflects the legitimate fears with which a free society en-
tertains the use of electronic surveillance."244 The ECPA
amended Title III in an effort to maintain the balance be-
tween rapidly developing technology and the laws governing
its use.245 In the eight years following the ECPA, technology
continued its headlong advance, prompting Congress to pass
the DTA in 1994.246 The congressional effort through the
DTA "to make sure American law keeps pace .. .and is re-
sponsive to the special characteristics [of new technolo-
gies],"247 raises important questions regarding the legality
and method of such efforts.
Critics worry that the DTA goes too far in allowing law
enforcement access to private conversations at the expense of
privacy and property rights guaranteed by the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments. 248 These issues have yet to be addressed
by the courts. Their resolution will have important implica-
tions regarding the ability for law to keep pace with and re-
main responsive to changes in technology. 249 Moreover, the
status of DTA's legality may well affect the process by which
241. Lawrence, supra note 223, at 272.
242. See supra text accompanying note 67.
243. 529 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1976).
244. Id. at 588.
245. See discussion supra part II.B.1.
246. See discussion supra parts II.B.2, II.B.3, II.C.
247. Leahy, supra note 97, at 1.
248. See discussion infra parts IV.C-IV.D.
249. See generally, BRANSCOMB, supra note 5 (stating that the law will even-
tually become extinct if it does not adapt to the changing technological
environment).
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future attempts to reconcile societal needs with technological
change are implemented.2 5 °
IV. ANALYsis
A. Weighing the Alternatives: Resolving the Dichotomy
Between Technological Development and the
Resulting Obsolescence of Wiretap Law
Just as the rise in organized crime prompted Congress to
pass Title III in 1968,251 the 1990s are characterized by an
impending rise in criminal use of sophisticated technology.252
Says ABC News' Dave Marash: "[W]hen the FBI looks into
the future, it sees trouble. It sees criminals like John Gotti
becoming able to shield their incriminating conversation from
surveillance and thereby becoming able to defeat law enforce-
ment's best evidence."2 53
The potential for such criminal evasion is enhanced by
technological advances hindering law enforcement's ability to
exercise its right to intercept communications under Title
III's strict guidelines. 254 The resulting dichotomy could be ig-
nored and Title III left untouched, gradually fading away as a
curious relic of the days when law enforcement was allowed
to conduct limited wiretaps to combat crime.2 5  Given the
infeasibility of such an approach, two other options are avail-
able: Attempt to resolve the dilemma through legislation, or
allow law enforcement and telephone carriers to reach their
own, private solution.256
B. A Legislative Approach as the Proper Solution
1. The Failure of the FBI's Non-Legislative Approach
While "private discussions" regarding surveillance capa-
bility between the FBI and private telephone companies seem
quite covert, novel, and perhaps even subversive of the demo-
cratic legal process, such closed-door discussions are nothing
new.257 Indeed, the FBI and telephone companies seemed
250. See infra part IV.C.
251. See discussion supra part II.A.1.
252. See infra text accompanying note 253.
253. Nightline, supra note 112; see discussion supra part II.B.2.
254. See discussion supra parts II.A.l.a, II.B.2.
255. See discussion supra note 5.
256. See discussion infra part LV.B.
257. See supra text accompanying note 78.
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258predisposed to resolve the digital dilemma in this manner.
Only the competitive realities of a non-monopolistic market-
place prevented the implementation of a non-legislative
solution.2 59
Such a non-legislative approach would necessarily be
short-term, only delaying and complicating inevitable public
scrutiny of the digital wiretap dilemma. The issue of govern-
ment monitoring of private conversations is too important to
evade public discussion for long.26 ° Eventually any "coopera-
tive agreement" would be exposed, likely with negative reper-
cussions to the FBI's accessibility goals following the inevita-
ble public outcry.261 As the 1994 House Report indicates,
"[f]rom a public policy perspective, such (non-legislative) ar-
rangements would have the disadvantage of being concluded
without public knowledge or legislative oversight."26 2 Thus, a
legislative solution should, far from being objectionable, be
preferable to the covert alternative.
2. Past Amendments to Title III Set a Strong
Precedent
To resolve any doubt that a legislative approach was the
proper method by which to resolve the digital wiretap access
question, one need look no further than the history of Title III
generally.26 In 1970, Congress first amended Title 111264 as
a means of legislatively overturning a United States Court of
Appeals judgment that carriers could not be required to as-
sist law enforcement's wiretapping efforts.2 65 The Supreme
Court in United States v. New York Telephone Co.,266 noted
the Congressional amendment with approval, even while
258. See discussion infra part II.B.4.a.
259. See discussion infra part II.B.4.a.
260. See supra text accompanying note 244.
261. Albeit exaggerated examples, note the eventual public disclosure of
Watergate and Iran-Contra. Once uncovered, one led to the resignation of a
President, and the other to the effective end of aid to the Nicaraguan rebels.
See, e.g., J. ANTHONY LUKAS, NIGHTMARE: THE UNDERSIDE OF THE NIXON YEARS
(1988) (discussing the Nixon presidency, including Watergate); BOB SCHEIFFER
& GARY P. GATES, THE ACTING PRESIDENT (1989) (providing a television re-
porter's view of the eight Reagan years, including the Iran-Contra scandal).
262. 1994 HouSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 14.
263. See discussion supra part II.A.
264. See discussion supra part II.A.2.
265. See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 177 n.25 (1977).
266. 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
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questioning whether the aim of the amendment was not al-
ready contained within the original Title III wording.26 7
Congress' continuing dedication to assure that Title III
remained responsive to modern technological realities was
further reflected in the comprehensive, if short-sighted, 1986
ECPA amendment.26 The organization of a task force in
1987 to further evaluate possible changes to Title III demon-
strates that even after the ECPA was passed, Congress envi-
sioned future legislative action sooner rather than later.269
The consistent nature of amendment throughout Title III's
existence attests to Congress' desire and willingness to tackle
the difficult questions posed by wiretap law directly and in a
public manner, through legislative rather than private
action.
3. Free and Open Debate: Drafting the DTA
While the wiretap reform effort culminating in the DTA
was the object of strong criticism, the legislation that resulted
was not formulated behind closed doors with one eye closed to
justice and the legislative process.2 7 0 Throughout its gesta-
tion, the legislation was subject to close scrutiny; the product
of over two years of vigorous, open debate and compromise
among a variety of stake holders with often conflicting
interests.2 71
Although not everyone, and perhaps no one, is com-
pletely satisfied in all respects with the DTA, this is indica-
tive of agreements reached by consensus rather than imposed
by force. All the participants in the Digital Telephony debate
had their say and received part of what they wanted. 2  The
FBI obtained its primary goal of wiretap access to digital tele-
phone transmissions; 273 the EFF successfully carved cyber-
267. Id. at 183.
268. See discussion supra part II.B.1.
269. See discussion supra part II.B.3.
270. See Memorandum from Don Edwards, House Judiciary Committee, to
Persons Interested in the Digital Telephony "Wiretap" Bill (Oct. 7, 1994) (on file
with author) (discussing how the legislative process helps insure public access
to the debate).
271. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 165,
195-96 and accompanying text (discussing telecommunications industry con-
cerns that the DTA is unfair and not the product of consensus).
272. But see supra note 272.
273. See supra text accompanying note 128.
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space 274 out of the Act by obtaining an exception for computer
networks, the Internet, and all other information services;
275
and the telephone industry obtained an important guarantee
that the Act would never be imposed so as to limit technologi-
cal development.27 6
Far from a harbinger of lost freedom emerging under the
guise of "technological advancement," the DTA was drafted in
a fashion that maintains and perhaps enhances an already
legally cognizable status quo.2 7 7
C. The Digital Telephony Act Addresses the Major Privacy
Challenges of its Critics
Simply put, the privacy concerns of the DTA's opponents
are unfounded given the careful, narrow statutory construc-
tion of the Act. The DTA applies the balance struck by prior
wiretap legislation to current technological realities, without
imposing undue restrictions on new technological develop-
ment.278 While concern regarding law enforcement utiliza-
tion of private, corporate premises in carrying out law en-
forcement duties is legitimate, any legal challenge to the DTA
on this basis is without merit. 9
In New York Telephone, the Court addressed the tele-
phone company's argument that "it is extraordinary to expect
citizens to directly involve themselves in the law enforcement
process."280  In rejecting the company's claim, the Court
pointed out that it was the company's own property that was
being used for unlawful purposes.28 1 For further support, the
Court cited an opinion by Justice Cardozo maintaining that
any citizen may be called on to enforce the justice of the
state.282
274. "Cyberspace" can be defined as "the burgeoning global, electronic-infor-
mation infrastructure of the present." Dan Burk, Patents in Cyberspace, 68
TUL. L. REv. 1, 3 n.9 (1993).
275. See supra text accompanying notes 176-77.
276. See supra text accompanying note 186.
277. See 1994 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6 at 17 (explaining that the new
bill includes enhanced privacy protections while not expanding the authority to
conduct wiretaps).
278. See discussion supra part II.C.3.
279. See infra text accompanying notes 281-87.
280. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 175 n.24 (1977).
281. Id. at 174.
282. Id. at 175 n.24. See supra text accompanying note 94.
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The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Shultz2 83 lays to
rest any Fourth Amendment argument against the DTA. The
Bank Secrecy Act at issue in that case was in many ways
analogous to the Digital Telephony Act. The Court held that
imposing regulatory monitoring requirements on companies
engaged in businesses susceptible to criminal use, did not vio-
late Fourth Amendment principles so long as established
court procedures were followed when the government sought
to obtain the monitored material.
2 4
Justice Douglas' dissent in Shultz, expressing concern
that some day the Shultz decision might lead the government
to require that telephone companies record and turn over all
conversations to the government,28 5 is misplaced when ap-
plied to the DTA. Unlike Douglas' hypothetical, under the
DTA, no recording can occur until a judicial wiretap order is
approved.28 6 Moreover, to assure that law enforcement may
only access digital communications for which a warrant has
been issued, the DTA requires that the manual process of
tapping into such communications be performed by carrier
personnel rather than by law enforcement.28 7
Thus, the privacy objections to the DTA appear unavail-
ing. Rather than provide the government greater power or
individuals less freedom, the DTA merely enables law en-
forcement agencies to fulfill the roles they were established to
perform, within the current high-tech framework of our soci-
ety.2 8 While an astute eye must be maintained to protect
against the "slippery slope" of new governmental powers be-
ing granted at the expense of cherished liberties, on the pri-
vacy side, the DTA provides an example of how changes to
our laws can and should be made in relation to rapid techno-
logical development.
283. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). See discussion
supra part II.C.4.a.
284. 416 U.S. at 53-54, 77.
285. Id. at 89-90 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
286. 18 U.S.C. § 2604 (1994).
287. Id.
288. See 1994 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 22-23 (explaining that the
DTA aims to preserve the status quo, rather than increase or diminish law en-
forcement power).
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D. To Take or Not to Take: The Real Issue
Accepting that no privacy rights are violated by the DTA,
the real issue becomes whether the DTA's system design re-
quirements amount to a governmental taking that must be
compensated under the Fifth Amendment.28 9 The require-
ment that carriers immediately install equipment enabling
law enforcement to conduct wiretaps 290 clearly falls under
the per se taking criteria established in Loretto.291 Such a
requirement constitutes a permanent physical occupation
since by its very nature it forces carriers to install fixed phys-
ical equipment on their property.292 Yet, even the DTA's crit-
ics must concede that this is an irrelevant basis for overturn-
ing the Act since the government has agreed to fully
compensate carriers for any such equipment.29 3
A more difficult question is presented when carriers up-
grade their equipment in the future. Under the DTA's terms,
the carrier itself must absorb any additional cost of making
such equipment wiretap accessible.294 Whether this require-
ment amounts to a taking under the Fifth Amendment de-
pends on how the issue is framed. For instance, the govern-
ment would likely argue that no "permanent physical
occupation" takes place, since the government is not forcing
the carriers to upgrade their equipment. In other words, the
carriers voluntarily bring the requirement upon themselves
by deciding to upgrade in the first place.
FCC v. Florida Power Corp.295 offers some support for
this argument. In Florida Power, the utility claimed the
FCC's lowering of the rental rates paid by cable companies to
rent Florida Power's poles amounted to a physical occupation
of its property. 96 The U.S. Supreme Court held that where
there is no "required acquiescence" to a regulation, there can
be no per se taking.297 Since Florida Power could decide not
289. See discussion supra part II.C.4.b.
290. See supra text accompanying note 189.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 220-22.
292. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
293. See supra text accompanying note 186.
294. At least so far as the new equipment is installed for the carrier's own
business purposes and not due to unreasonable capacity increases requested by
law enforcement. Supra text accompanying notes 190-91.
295. 480 U.S. 245 (1987). See also discussion supra note 225.
296. 480 U.S. at 252.
297. Id.
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to rent its poles at all rather than accept the lower rental set
by the FCC, the element of required acquiescence was not
present.298
In case of the DTA, the government would similarly ar-
gue that since the telephone companies could decide not to
upgrade their equipment at all rather than comply with the
regulation, no forced physical occupation occurs. The tele-
phone carriers could respond that, unlike renting power
poles, upgrading telephone equipment eventually becomes a
competitive, if not technological necessity. Thus, the carriers
would argue that they will eventually be forced either to stop
business or upgrade and pay to assure wiretap accessibility.
Under this scenario, the DTA's requirement could be viewed
as required acquiescence, invoking the per se taking doctrine.
The U.S Supreme Court's holding in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission2 1 could also be used by the carriers to
counter any reliance by the government on Florida Power. In
Nollan, a property owner was not permitted to build unless
he provided public access along his beach front.3 °° Since the
government conditioned the building permit upon the grant
of access, it could be argued that required acquiescence was
not present. The owner could have avoided the regulation by
deciding not to build at all. Thus, if the reasoning in Florida
Power applied in Nollan, the Court should have concluded
that no per se taking existed.
Instead, the Nollan Court relied on the theory that since
a member of the public could at all times be on the Nollan's
property due to the access requirement, the requirement
amounted to a permanent physical occupation. 30 1 Telephone
carriers might similarly argue that since, theoretically, law
enforcement can at all times access the carriers' equip-
ment,30 2 such access amounts to a permanent occupation re-
quiring compensation.
If the carriers are unsuccessful in establishing a per se
Loretto taking, they could still invoke the Agins analysis,30 3
298. Id.
299. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). See also discussion supra notes 226-30 and accom-
panying text.
300. Id. at 828-30.
301. Id. at 832.
302. Provided, of course, they had secured the appropriate warrants. 18
U.S.C. § 2607 (1994).
303. Supra text accompanying note 232.
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and thus attempt to establish a regulatory taking without
showing permanent physical occupation. However, non-
physical occupation regulatory takings are extremely difficult
to establish, °4 and the telephone industry would be unlikely
to satisfy both prongs of the Agins test. The DTA would prob-
ably avoid characterization as a taking under the first prong
of Agins since it substantially advances the prevention of
"crime carried out through interstate commerce.30 5
Even if the DTA's requirements were deemed not to ad-
vance a substantial state interest, telephone carriers would
still have difficulty demonstrating that the DTA denies them
viable economic use-Agins' second prong.30 6 This is espe-
cially true in light of the DTA's requirement that carriers
must only make future equipment wiretap compatible if the
cost of doing so is reasonable. 30 7 In sum, the Agins balancing
test firmly favors a finding that no taking occurs under the
DTA.
It therefore appears that if the carriers are to succeed in
challenging the DTA as a taking, they must convince the
court that the DTA requirements amount to a permanent
physical occupation. As noted above, both sides have strong
arguments on this issue. Nevertheless, the issue would not
be ripe for adjudication until future upgrades covered by the
DTA begin taking place.30 8 Congress should take advantage
of this window to resolve the issue before adjudication, mind-
ful that, if a taking were found it would not necessarily inval-
idate the DTA, 30 but it could lessen the Act's effectiveness.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 233-41.
305. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
306. Supra note 232 and accompanying text.
307. Supra note 191 and accompanying text.
308. Courts generally refuse to decide Fifth Amendment taking cases where
there is only the alleged possibility of a future taking occurring, especially
where the harm that may be suffered is uncertain. This is based on the concept
of ripeness. See, eg., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (discussing ripeness
doctrine).
309. At least so long as the government agreed to compensate the carriers for
the cost of the physical occupation (i.e. the cost of making equipment wiretap
accessible).
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V. PROPOSAL
As we enter the era of the "information superhigh-
way,"310 the current controversy over digital wiretapping is
but the latest struggle in the battle to determine the legal
standards of cyberspace. The deluge of new technology com-
prising the information age has in many ways outstripped
laws formulated at a time when the widespread digital tech-
nologies now available seemed no closer than the latest sci-
ence fiction and espionage thrillers.3 11 The manner in which
high-tech legal debates, such as that surrounding digital
wiretapping, are resolved, will impact how legal standards
arising in the information age will be established. In the spe-
cific context of the DTA, the following two considerations
should be applied.
First, efforts to resolve broad ranging legal issues quietly
and behind closed doors, as exemplified by the FBI's initial
attempt to reform wiretap law, 12 are unacceptable and
should be prohibited by law. Although such privately im-
posed standards often appear more cost-effective and less
burdensome to the parties directly involved, they would lack
enforceability and would rightly be perceived as illegitimate.
As the DTA experience demonstrates, public debate and com-
promise is necessary if laws affecting technology and society
are to adequately balance competing interests.313
The second consideration regards Congress' approach to-
wards the DTA's opponents concerns. As previously noted, it
appears that the only legally questionable aspect of the DTA's
validity is whether some portions of the Act constitute a Fifth
Amendment taking. 1 4 Rather than take a "see you in court"
attitude, Congress should act in consultation with the major
interested parties to resolve the uncertainty surrounding this
issue. Through such a proactive stance, Congress can engen-
der a cooperative atmosphere that will not only lead to easier
310. Information superhighways have been described as "computer networks
formed by a sets of computers linked together by means of communication me-
dia." Burk, supra note 275, at 7.
311. See discussion supra parts II.B.2., II.B.3. See generally BRANSCOMB,
supra note 5.
312. See discussion infra part II.B.4.b.
313. Compare the privacy protections encompassed by the DTA with what
would have resulted if the FBI's covert attempt, or even its ram-rod legislative
initiative, had been successful. See supra parts II.B.4, II.B.C-C.3.
314. See discussion supra part IV.D.
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implementation of the DTA, but also aid in the drafting of
future legislation addressing similar technological issues.
Accordingly, Congress should accept that the concerns of
the telecommunications industry regarding future costs of
compliance are legitimate. Rather than dismissing future
costs as inevitably de minimis,3' 5 a commission should be es-
tablished to evaluate telephone carriers concerns. In the pro-
cess, a least-cost solution, possibly in the form of a federal
"communications tax" imposed on consumers' telephone calls,
could be arranged.
A tax would resolve the concerns of the parties without
the need to adjudicate the takings issue. Congress would
avoid the need to appropriate additional funds, and the tele-
phone industry would avoid expenditures serving no legiti-
mate business function. Although apparently not proposed
during the DTA debate, such a tax is not an unreasonable
proposal. Properly administered, the tax could result in sig-
nificant savings to telecommunication carriers and consum-
ers alike.
Such a tax would have several additional attributes.
First, without a tax it is likely that carriers would merely
pass any additional system design costs onto customers in the
form of higher rates. At least with a tax, customers will know
that any rate increase is unrelated to the DTA, rather than
having to rely on their carrier's word.
Second, if the tax proceeds were distributed by the gov-
ernment on an ad hoc basis determined through consultation
with law enforcement, the need to guarantee that all systems
across the board are wiretap accessible might decrease. For
example, law enforcement may decide some carrier central of-
fices in rural areas need not maintain wiretap accessible fa-
cilities, thereby decreasing the expense of the entire program.
Finally, a tax would assure an even playing field among
telecommunication carriers. If costs of complying with the
DTA are indeed as substantial as the telecommunications in-
dustry fears,3 16 smaller carriers will not face a competitive
disadvantage when upgrading their systems.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 193-97.
316. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Over two-hundred years of American jurisprudence have
borne-out the truth that the fundamental concepts embodied
in the Constitution are in many ways impervious to time and
technological change. The concepts of liberty and freedom
survived the industrial revolution, and they can survive the
information revolution as well. Just as technological innova-
tion is a dynamic process, so is the legal balance between
public and private liberties.
However, the adaptation of law and technology must be
conducted within the established legal framework. By pass-
ing through this framework, including substantial debate
and revision, the DTA emerged as legislation addressing the
major concerns of stakeholders and meeting the constitu-
tional tests of the law. The balancing of interests incorpo-
rated in the DTA offers a template for how law can be recon-
ciled with modern technology in the information age.
Andrew R. Hull
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